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Abstract 
Mind wandering is a very exciting topic in cognitive science, and as such, different researchers 
have come up with different hypotheses and models to explain it. One model, introduced by 
Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden, and D’Argembeau in 2011, conceptualizes 
conscious thoughts along the two dimensions of task-relatedness and stimulus-dependency. From 
these two dimensions they generated a four-way model of thoughts, including mind wandering 
and external distractions. The current study aimed to evaluate this model, particularly regarding 
the empirical distinction between mind wandering and external distractions, by using 
confirmatory factor analyses to see how external distractions and mind wandering relate to one 
another and to other variables, such as working memory capacity and attentional restraint. It was 
found that the distinction made by Stawarczyk and colleagues – especially regarding the 
inclusion of interoceptive stimuli with external distractions – did not seem to hold up.  
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Introduction 
On Mind Wandering 
People lead rich mental lives disconnected from their surroundings and the tasks they are 
engaged in. Classic examples of this include drifting away from the meaning of text while 
reading and considering one’s future plans during the drive home. These internal mental 
experiences are often referred to as task-unrelated thoughts or mind wandering. Recently, 
research on mind wandering has come to focus on determining why it occurs, how it operates, 
and how it is distinct from other types of mental activity. 
 In a 2013 review, Smallwood presents four hypotheses about the underlying mechanisms 
of mind wandering: current concerns, decoupling, executive failure, and meta-awareness. The 
current concerns hypothesis (Klinger, 1975, 2013) suggests that mind wandering occurs when 
external perceptual information lacks salience, causing the mind to be drawn away from the 
outside world and toward more salient personal matters that are cued by both external stimuli 
and the internal stream of thought. The decoupling hypothesis relies on the notion of domain-
general mental processes the likes of executive control, proposing that such processes act to keep 
a particular train of thought on track once it has been initiated (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). 
The executive failure hypothesis characterizes mind wandering as potentially distracting internal 
thoughts which wrest attention from the task at hand when executive control fails to keep the 
mind directed toward it (McVay & Kane, 2009, 2010, 2012). Finally, the meta-awareness 
hypothesis postulates that mind wandering represents a deviation from a desired mental goal 
state, and that meta-awareness may generally act to correct this deviation (Schooler, 2002; 
Schooler et al., 2011). 
 Of note, Smallwood makes the point that his own decoupling hypothesis is fundamentally 
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not in conflict with any of the other hypotheses presented. He characterizes this hypothesis as 
being about how mind wandering is maintained once it has begun – the process of mind 
wandering. Meanwhile, the other three hypotheses constitute mechanisms by which mind 
wandering gets started in the first place – the occurrence of mind wandering. Additionally, he 
makes mention of a Control × Concerns and Control Failure × Concerns models of mind 
wandering. The first of these suggests that mind wandering is triggered by personal concerns, 
which then recruit domain-general executive resources for processing (Smallwood & Schooler, 
2006). The second treats mind wandering as a loss of executive control over ongoing, 
automatically cued thoughts (McVay & Kane, 2010). All told, Smallwood is suggesting that one 
or more of these mechanisms of occurrence could fit together with his process of decoupling, 
forming a so-called process–occurrence framework of mind wandering.  
 Being that the decoupling account is not mutually exclusive with any of the other three, it 
is strange that recent research (e.g., Stawarczyk, Majerus, Catale, & D’Argembeau, 2014) has set 
it at odds with the executive failure account. Although the debate in the past was certainly lively 
(McVay & Kane, 2009, 2010; Smallwood, 2010), the strongest proponents of the executive 
failure hypothesis are no longer committed to mutual exclusivity between their hypothesis and 
the decoupling hypothesis (Kane & McVay, 2012). Clearly, neither is Smallwood, given the 
review described above. Thus, going forward, it makes more sense to treat these hypotheses as 
complementary, rather than conflicting. 
For much of the history of mind wandering research, subjects’ self-reported thoughts 
have been assessed along dimensions of either task-relatedness or stimulus-dependency 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Smallwood, 2009). Task-relatedness is the degree to which a 
person is currently focused on the task at hand, and ranges from completely focused to 
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completely off-task. Stimulus-dependency refers to whether or not a person’s thoughts are 
directly related to stimuli present in the environment, including both the task and other stimuli. 
Thoughts completely unrelated to these stimuli are considered to be stimulus-independent. Both 
off-task and stimulus-independent reports were considered to be indicative of mind wandering, 
although they may also reflect different sorts of thoughts. For example, a thought which is 
captured by stimuli, yet unrelated to the task at hand might be importantly different from one 
which is neither stimulus-dependent nor task-related (Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der 
Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2011). Thus, it becomes important to see whether this and other 
distinctions have empirical merit. 
By no means has this need been lost on the field – various researchers have pointed it out, 
leading to the implementation of a widening variety of thought probes. For example, Ward & 
Wegner (2013) conducted a series of experiments – including both open ended and forced choice 
thought probes – aimed at differentiating mind wandering from mind blanking. Mind blanking is 
thought of as a momentary halt in cognitive activity, rather than the ongoing thoughts of mind 
wandering. Smallwood, McSpadden, and Schooler (2007) assessed the effects of mind 
wandering with awareness (tuning out) and without awareness (zoning out) on task performance, 
and later used the same probe to assess the temporal effects of mind wandering (Smallwood, 
McSpadden, & Schooler, 2008). McVay & Kane (2012) used a six-choice thought probe, 
including three temporal content options: a memory from the past, something in the future, and 
current state of being. Finally, Stawarczyk et al. (2011a) introduced the model to be evaluated – 
a two-by-two model of thoughts based on dimensions of stimulus dependency and task 
relatedness. In the following sections, I will discuss this model in further detail, followed by my 
concerns about it. I will then propose a study designed to evaluate it using data on mind 
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wandering, attentional control, and working memory. 
The Model 
Perceiving a need for a more systematic approach to thought probes in mind wandering 
research, Stawarczyk et al. (2011a) moved to formulate a more fine-tuned conception of the sorts 
of thoughts people have. Given the fact that much research had previously treated either 
stimulus-independent or task-unrelated thoughts as mind wandering, they argued that mind 
wandering may consist of thoughts that are both independent of stimuli in the environment and 
unrelated to the task at hand. Therefore, they suggested that thoughts be measured along the two 
dimensions of task-relatedness and stimulus-dependency. From this, they generated a four-way 
model of thoughts which could be translated into a four-item thought probe.  
This model (Figure 1) combines the two aforementioned dimensions in four possible 
ways. The first is stimulus-dependent/task-related thoughts, or fully on-task. The second 
combination is stimulus-independent/task-related thoughts, or task-related interference (TRI). 
That is, being distracted by one’s appraisal of task features, such as one’s performance on the 
task. Third, there are stimulus-dependent/task-unrelated thoughts, or external distractions (ED). 
External distractions are said to come from both exteroceptive perceptions (e.g., sounds or visual 
stimuli) and interoceptive sensations (e.g., hunger or thirst). Finally, stimulus-independent/task-
unrelated thoughts (SITUTs) are characterized as mind wandering, daydreaming, and similar 
phenomena. 
 Evidence for the validity of this model comes primarily from three studies. The first, in 
which the model was originally introduced, consisted of two experiments (Stawarczyk et al., 
2011a), although only the first is relevant in the current context. This experiment was a simple 
validation of the new model. It used a classic go/no-go task known as the sustained attention to 
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response task (SART) combined with a four-item thought probe based on the four-quadrant 
model. The principal findings were that both types of task-unrelated thoughts (EDs and SITUTs) 
were associated with lower SART performance (slower response times and more errors to the 
target), but that SITUTs were distinguishable from EDs by self-report. The major takeaway from 
this was that thought probes in general needed to be more precise and more comprehensive, 
because subtle differences in types of thoughts might be missed. 
 The second study (Stawarczyk, Majerus, Paquet, & D’Argembeau, 2011) was meant to 
determine the neural correlates of the researchers’ thought type distinctions. Participants 
completed the SART with thought probes while undergoing fMRI scans. It was found that areas 
of the default mode network – a neural network known to be associated with mind wandering 
(Gruberger, Ben-Simon, Levkovitz, Zangen, & Hendler, 2011; Smallwood, Baird, Brown, & 
Schooler, 2012) and internally directed attention (Dang, O’Neil, & Jugast, 2012) – were active 
when participants reported TRIs, EDs, or SITUTs. Notably, there was considerable overlap of 
activity in certain areas across dimensions of stimulus-dependence and task-relatedness, 
including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and the 
precuneus. That is, these areas of the DMN showed greater activity just prior to participant 
reports of TRIs, EDs, and SITUTs than they did just prior to on-task reports. However, rather 
than finding an interaction effect between stimulus-dependence and task-relatedness in these 
areas, the researchers reported an additive effect of SITUTs on neural activity over and above 
TRIs and EDs. 
Third, Stawarczyk et al. (2014) used their thought probe to assess the relationships 
among different types of internal cognition, working memory capacity, proactive and reactive 
attentional control, and general fluid intelligence (gF) in young adults and adolescents. 
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Adolescents were chosen as a group because, according to the researchers, they should be 
expected to show weaker attentional control abilities than their older counterparts. The 
researchers assessed WMC with a listening span task, both forms of attentional control with a 
continuous performance task, and general fluid intelligence with Raven’s Progressive Matrices. 
They also included items from several questionnaires, most notably the Daydreaming Frequency 
Scale (DDFS). Thought probes were included within a version of the SART, as in the other two 
studies. SITUTs and EDs were carefully distinguished in the instructions, with particular focus 
on the notion that a thought triggered by a distracting perception, but about something else, 
counted as mind wandering, not an external distraction. 
SITUTs and EDs negatively affected SART performance (lower accuracy to the targets 
and higher response time variability) to a similar degree among both young adults and 
adolescents. SITUT reports were associated with reports of mind wandering in daily life on the 
DDFS in both groups. A variance partitioning analysis found that EDs, SITUTs, and an 
attentional composite Z-score (WMC, Raven’s matrices, and both forms of attentional control) 
predicted 41% of the variance in SART accuracy in young adults. Most relevant to the focus of 
the current study, SITUTs significantly accounted for 7% of SART accuracy variance over and 
above the attentional composite and EDs. EDs only accounted for 1% of accuracy variance over 
and above SITUTs and the attentional composite.  
My Concerns 
Concerns about this model arise primarily from the characterization of external 
distractions as being reliably different from mind wandering. Conceptually, it makes sense to 
distinguish the two. On the one hand, an external distraction might draw attention away from the 
task at hand without generating any conscious thoughts. On the other, mind wandering consists 
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of conscious thoughts – in some form or another – by definition. Both would be expected to 
cause problems with task performance, although perhaps for different reasons. 
In the model in question, any thoughts about stimuli not related to the task are considered 
external distractions. However, given the above understanding, it is questionable whether 
external distractions can be classified as a type of thought, rather than just a momentary 
attentional shift. There is an important conceptual disconnect here. Because participants are 
being asked to report their conscious thoughts about interoceptive and exteroceptive perceptions, 
it may be that the thought probe is merely capturing another form of mind wandering, rather than 
actual external distractions. In other words, despite the careful instructional distinction made by 
Stawarczyk et al. (2014), it is not entirely clear that EDs and SITUTs are reliably separable in a 
self-report framework.  
Furthermore, defining mind wandering as a stimulus-independent task-unrelated thought 
has its own conceptual complications. It may be that a distracting stimulus could generate mind 
wandering. For instance, if a participant were distracted by a small bit of chipped paint on the 
wall, he or she might be thrown into a mind wandering episode about painting his or her 
bedroom walls. Because this new thought is not wholly independent of the stimulus that inspired 
it, it may not be easily classified as a stimulus-independent task-unrelated thought. Yet, it would 
be difficult to dispute its nature as mind wandering. Thus, SITUTs may be too restrictive of a 
category to capture all of what constitutes mind wandering. 
Additionally, even if mind wandering and external distraction are fundamentally 
different, it may not make sense to include both interoceptive and exteroceptive stimuli in the 
same category. It may be the case that, because of their different perceptual loci, they are 
themselves different in some important way. 
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Aside from the conceptual issues raised above, there are a few methodological flaws 
which merit discussion. In the first study (Stawarczyk et al, 2011a), there are no references to 
external criteria of validity. People were able to self-report EDs or SITUTs when asked about 
them, however, this does not guarantee that they were actually reporting experiences of the sorts 
intended by the researchers. For example, some participants may have been reporting external 
distractions when they were really thinking about something else, but those thoughts were 
triggered by a distracting stimulus. 
Stawarczyk et al. (2011b) again did not have any reliable external criteria of validity. 
Although their thought probes were related to neural activity, they were still relying on people to 
accurately report their thoughts in relation to the categories provided to them. Therefore, just by 
relating thought probe responses to neural activity, there is no guarantee that they are relating 
actual experiences to neural activity. Because of this, it is not clear what conclusions can actually 
be drawn from the finding that SITUTs had an additive effect on activity in certain brain areas. 
Given the questionable nature of the distinction between mind wandering and external 
distraction in the first two studies, it is not clear that distinguishing between them was necessary 
or beneficial in the latest study (Stawarczyk, 2014). That said, it is worth noting that a recent 
study (Unsworth & McMillan, 2014) showed that latent variables of mind wandering and 
external distraction showed best fit in a model in which they were separate-but-correlated. The 
researchers also tested two other models – one in which mind wandering and external distraction 
were treated as a single latent variable and one in which they were treated as completely 
separate. Both of these showed comparatively poor fit. Given these results, it may be that there is 
empirical merit to the distinction despite the concerns that have been raised. 
My Study 
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The data being used to evaluate this model come from a previously collected data-set, 
one of the most extensive studies of its type on the relationships between mind wandering, 
working memory capacity, attentional control, creativity, and schizotypy. Because of our large 
sample size, we have an impressive pool of data to analyze, as well as a high level of statistical 
power. Additionally, of our various measures, WMC and attentional control are known to 
correlate with mind wandering (Kane & McVay, 2012; McVay & Kane, 2012). In this case, 
mind wandering has been operationalized as a composite of various kinds of task-unrelated 
thoughts (TUTs), rather than SITUTs. The types of TUT reports collected include external 
distraction-like categories of current state of being and external environment, as well as SITUT-
like categories of everyday things, personal worries, and, daydreams. This will provide the 
means of evaluating the relationship between mind wandering and external distraction, and more 
particularly, the findings from Stawarczyk et al. (2014).  
In addition to the general wealth of data afforded by such a large sample, we also have a 
wide variety of tasks covering our various measures. For example, in measuring working 
memory capacity, we used six different tasks. Of these, four were complex span tasks and two 
were memory updating tasks. By approaching each construct with a variety of tasks, we gain a 
significant advantage over approaches that use only one or two: performance differences on the 
specific processing skills involved in one given task (e.g., math problems in operation span) do 
not have as much of an overall effect on the variance measured. That is, we get a clearer picture 
of each participant’s actual WMC, attentional restraint, etc. Finally, we have also included 
thought probes in both attention and working memory tasks, meaning we can better assess how 
performance on each type of task is affected by mind wandering. 
Method 
EXTERNAL DISTRACTIONS OR MORE MIND WANDERING 12 
 
 
Participants 
 Five hundred forty-five (545) undergraduates from the University of North Carolina 
Greensboro participated in this study for partial fulfillment of a Psychology course requirement.  
A total of 543 participants completed the first session of the study, of which 492 completed the 
second session, and 472 finished all three.  
Mind Wandering Probes 
 Thought probes were included in five tasks. The probes themselves were the same across 
tasks, although the probe instructions were altered slightly to fit different tasks. For instance, in 
the numerical Stroop task, they referred to objects on the screen; in the n-back, they referred to 
the words on the screen. The participants were occasionally interrupted during certain tasks with 
a popup screen which said: 
 What were you just thinking about? 
 1. The task 
 2. Task experience/performance 
 3. Everyday things 
 4. Current state of being 
 5. Personal worries 
 6. Daydreams 
 7. External environment 
 8. Other 
Subjects responded by pressing a number key matching the type of thoughts they were 
experiencing when the probe popped up. Two types of probe instructions were used in each 
session of the study. In the first task per session to include thought probes, a longer, more 
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verbose set of probe instructions was presented. In each subsequent task per session to include 
thought probes, a more compact version of the same set of instructions was used to save on time. 
As Figure 2 shows, the response choices should readily map onto the model created by 
Stawarczyk et al. The first response is on-task and the second is TRI. Responses 4 and 7 seem to 
be analogous to EDs. Responses 3, 5, and 6 seem to be like SITUTs. Response 8 might also map 
onto one of these categories, but there were conceptual concerns about how to interpret it, so it 
was left out of all analyses. 
WMC Tasks 
 Working memory capacity was measured using six different tasks across the three 
sessions of the study. Of these, four were complex span tasks, while three were memory updating 
tasks.  
Complex span tasks. The complex span tasks used were operation span, symmetry span, 
rotation span, and reading span. Each of these tasks consists of completing a relatively simple 
processing task while trying to keep an ordered list of information in mind for later recall, with 
the to-be-recalled items presented one-by-one in between processing trials. Operation span 
(OPERSPAN) required participants to indicate whether or not compound equations (e.g., [3 + 6]/ 
3 = 3) were correct, while keeping in mind ordered sets of letters. Symmetry span 
(SYMMSPAN) required them to judge whether pictures containing patterns of black and white 
boxes were symmetrical on the vertical axis, while simultaneously keeping in mind ordered 
patterns of red boxes presented in a 4 x 4 white grid. Reading span (READSPAN) required 
participants to judge whether sentences made sense, while at the same time keeping sequences of 
words in mind.  Finally, for rotation span (ROTASPAN), participants decided whether letters 
that had been rotated out of regular alignment were facing the normal direction or mirror 
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reversed, after mentally rotating them back to normal. At the same time, participants had to keep 
in mind sequences of large and small arrows pointing in one of eight different directions.  
For each span task, participants were given separate practice trials for both the processing 
and the memory portions. As well, participants were required to recall the memory items in order 
(from an array that consisted of all possible memory items for the task). They had to keep their 
performance on the processing portions at or above 85% in order to ensure that they were 
engaged in processing, rather than just rehearsing memory items. Finally, they were given 
feedback on both processing performance and number of items recalled after each trial.  
Memory updating tasks. The two memory updating tasks were updating counters 
(COUNTERS) and running span (RUNNSPAN). In the counters task, participants were shown 3-
5 square frames in a row on the screen. A number then appeared in each frame, in a random 
order, and participants had to keep these numbers in mind. Then, a random set of these numbers 
were “updated” by displaying a number with a plus or minus sign in random frames. Participants 
had to add or subtract this number from the previous number in that frame. At the end of the 
“updating” portion of the task, participants were asked to fill in the most recent number values of 
each frame in a random order. The ending number in each frame was always between 1 and 9. 
In the running span task, participants were presented with series of letters which varied in 
length. Trials were split into blocks. Before each block, participants were given a particular 
number of the last letters in each trial (usually shorter than the list length). They had to recall 
these last letters, in the order presented, at the end of each trial. 
 
Attention Restraint Tasks 
 Attention restraint tasks ask participants to stop themselves from engaging in a dominant 
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response in favor of a different goal-directed response. To assess attention restraint ability, 
participants were given two anti-saccade tasks, a semantic sustained attention to response task, a 
numerical Stroop task, and a spatial Stroop task.  
 Antisaccade tasks. The first antisaccade task involved judging which of three letters 
appeared on the opposite side of the screen from a flashing cue symbol (=) before being masked 
(ANTI-LETT). The three letters were B, P, and R and the mask was a rapid sequence of the letter 
H, followed by the number 8. In the second antisaccade task (ANTI-ARO), participants had to 
indicate which of four arrows – pointing up, down, left, or right – appeared on the opposite side 
of the screen from a flashing cue symbol (=). In both tasks, participants were given a practice 
session that involved identifying targets presented briefly in the center of the screen, in order to 
familiarize them with the targets. This type of task is challenging because the quick flashing cues 
pull attention away from the location where the target will appear. If participants do not quickly 
suppress the prepotent response to look at the cue, they will miss the target. 
 SART. The version of the SART used in this study had participants judge whether a 
word presented in the center of the screen belonged to either of two categories – animal or 
vegetable. Between each word was presented a row of X’s. For each presentation of an animal, 
the more common of the two categories at 89% of trials, participants pressed the spacebar. For 
each presentation of a vegetable (only 11% of trials), participants had to refrain from pressing the 
spacebar. This task included thought probes. 
 Numerical Stroop (N-STROOP). In this task, participants had to indicate the number of 
digits displayed on the screen by pressing one of three keys (B, N, or M) with the index, middle, 
or ring finger. The digits consisted of sets of 2’s, 3’s, and 4’s in a row on the midline of the 
screen. Each set could contain two, three, or four digits, and participants were told to attend to 
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the number of digits in each set, rather than digit identity. They were also told that the important 
trials in the task were those in which the digit identities and the number of digits on the screen 
did not match (e.g., 222, 3333, or 44), rather than those in which identity and number of digits 
did match (e.g., 22, 333, or 4444). This task included thought probes. 
 Spatial Stroop (S-STROOP). This task was split into two blocks, only the first of which 
was analyzed here. The displays consisted of an asterisk placed above, below, or to the left or 
right of the midpoint of the screen. The words, “above,” “below,” “left,” and “right” each might 
appear above, below, or to the left or right of the asterisk. Participants were instructed to report 
the location of each word relative to the asterisk, ignoring both the meaning of the word and the 
absolute location of the word and the asterisk on the screen. All responses were made using the 
arrow keys of the numerical keypad (8, 4, 6, and 2) on a standard keyboard. 
Other Tasks 
 The full study includes three other sets of tasks. One set measured attention constraint 
ability, once measured dimensions of schizotypy, and the third measured divergent thinking as a 
test of creativity. For a description of these tasks, see Kane, Meier, Smeekens, Gross, Gates, 
Silvia, and Kwapil (under revision). For the purposes of the current study, schizotypy and 
creativity measures are not relevant, as they do not readily contribute to understanding the 
relationship between external distractions and mind wandering; the attention constraint construct 
was not modeled very well by its marker tasks. Of the constraint tasks, two included thought 
probes, and so the data from these probes will be included in analyses. 
Procedure 
 Participants carried out the tasks over three approximately two-hour sessions. They sat in 
front of a computer, either in a small room alone with an experimenter or in a larger room with 
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up to three other participants. The experimenter read task instructions aloud directly from the 
computer screen and directed the participant(s) when it was time to advance to a new screen of 
instructions. In group sessions, new tasks were not started until after each participant had 
finished the previous task. In single participant sessions, new tasks were started as soon as the 
participant finished. All programs were coded in Eprime, and were only opened by 
experimenters.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all WMC and attention restraint tasks for 
subjects whose data were usable; see Kane et al. (under revision) for detailed descriptions and 
justifications for excluded data points. All of these variables were normally distributed.  Table 2 
shows a correlation matrix containing all WMC and attention restraint measures. The 
correlations provide evidence of convergent and discriminant validity – measures of WMC and 
attention restraint each show stronger correlations with measures of their own construct than they 
do with measures of the other construct (but correlations with the other construct are sizeable). 
Additionally, there is evidence of domain specificity and domain generality in the WMC tasks. 
Tasks with similar features, such as operation span and reading span, were more strongly 
correlated with one another, while correlations between tasks with different features were still 
substantial. 
 Because the aim of this study is to get at very fine distinctions between types of off-task 
thought reports, the probe data were broken down on a task-by-task basis and proportions were 
calculated for responses 2-7 in two ways. First, they were calculated as a proportion of each 
response type to all thought probe responses (ALL). Second, they were calculated as a proportion 
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of each response type to only the off-task responses (responses 2-8; OFF). Tables 3 and 4 
provide descriptive statistics for the ALL and OFF, respectively. In general, these proportions 
were highly positively skewed and highly leptokurtic. This is not surprising at all, as any given 
thought category would have had relatively few responses. In both cases, the minimum 
proportion of all thought responses was zero. Maximum proportions were variable in both cases, 
but less so in OFF. Medians were also variable in both cases, with many medians being at or near 
zero. This is again indicative of the fact that any one thought category would have relatively few 
responses overall. 
 Tables 5 and 6 present full correlation matrices for ALL and OFF, respectively. In 
general, these correlations have a few important features. First, the proportions of any particular 
response type were positively correlated across any two tasks. For example, the correlation 
between the proportion of response 3 in the n-back task and the numerical Stroop task was .211 
for ALL and .152 for OFF. Second, response proportion correlations across tasks increased for 
tasks that were completed in the same session – for instance, the correlation between response 3 
in arrow flanker and the numerical Stroop was .514 for ALL and .433 for OFF. Taken together, 
these observations indicate that people showed a certain amount of consistency in thought 
reports across tasks, and that this consistency was increased when thought probes were included 
in same-session tasks. 
Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
 Originally, the plan was to use latent variable analyses with response types as the latent 
variables. However, none of the latent variable models tested showed acceptable fit. Upon 
review of the data, it seems likely that this is due to the high skew and kurtosis values of the 
thought probe proportion distributions. Latent variable models assume normality in the measured 
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variables, and good fit is highly unlikely (if the model even runs) when this assumption is 
violated (Schreiber, Nora, Stage, Barlow & King, 2006). Because of this unfortunate fit problem, 
we turned instead to a hybrid from confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) in which the predictors 
(WMC and attention restraint) were modeled as latent variables while the outcome measures 
(proportions of each thought type) were modeled as manifest variables. 
 In order to conduct CFAs with manifest outcome variables, we first computed the means 
of response proportions across all tasks (e.g., proportion of “daydream” responses across all 5 
tasks), creating composite thought category variables. These were correlated with WMC and 
attention restraint failure factors. These latent factors represent the shared variance of all WMC 
tasks and attention restraint tasks, respectively. As well, the composite thought category 
variables were correlated pairwise. Separate models were created for ALL and OFF. These 
models are shown in Figures 3 and 4, leaving out correlations between composites as a matter of 
space. These correlations are instead displayed in Tables 7 and 8.  
To assess the degree to which each model fits the data, several common fit statistics were 
calculated. Chi square significance tests with non-significant results show good fit (although, 
with large samples such as ours, the chi square is almost always significant, and so other fit 
indices are also used). The comparative fit index (CFI) and the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) both 
show adequate fit at values at or above .90. The Root Mean Square Residual of Approximation 
(RMSEA) and the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) both indicate adequate fit 
with values at or below .08. 
 ALL Model. The first model shows how WMC and attention restraint factors related to 
the ALL composites, which reflect the proportion of each response type to all thought probe 
responses. Fit statistics for this model were as follows: χ
2 
(110) = 245.71, p < .001, CFI = .913, 
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TLI = .880, SRMR = .044, RMSEA = .048 [95%CI .040, .056]. Of these, only the TLI did not 
meet the standard for good fit (≥ .90). However, given that all of the other statistics indicated 
good fit and the TLI was very close to the .90 threshold, this model fit the data well enough to 
draw useful conclusions. Factor loadings were significant at p < .001 for all task measures 
related to both factors. Residual correlations between certain tasks (OPERSPAN and 
READSPAN; SYMMSPAN and ROTASPAN; SART_D and SART_SD) were modeled to 
account for variance shared by those specific task measures over and above the variance captured 
by the WMC and attention restraint factors. These residuals capture variance attributed to similar 
task features (i.e., OPERSPAN and READSPAN are both verbal span tasks, and so they have 
similar features). The correlation between WMC and attention restraint failures is -.644 [95%CI -
.738, -.550] – higher working memory capacity was associated with fewer restraint failures. This 
lines up with the findings of several studies (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2012; Unsworth & McMillan, 
2014). 
 Of the composite variables, WMC was significantly correlated (p < .05) with only one: 
personal worries (-.116, [-.230, -.003]). Attention restraint failure was correlated significantly 
with only two: personal worries (.140 [.034, .246]) and daydreams (.103 [.016, .189]).  
 Turning to the correlations among thought content composites, only everyday thoughts 
were significantly correlated with all the other composites. They were negatively correlated with 
everything but TRIs, meaning that people were generally either reporting everyday thoughts or 
they were reporting something else. That said, these negative correlations were weak to modest 
(ranging from -.093 to -.294). The correlation between everyday thoughts and TRIs (.086 [.001, 
.171]) was very weak, and it was only just below the p < .05 threshold with a p-value of .048, so 
it is not entirely clear how it should be interpreted. Aside from everyday thoughts, the personal 
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worries variable was the only one to show any significant correlations with any of the other 
composites. Specifically, it showed modest negative correlations with TRIs (-.113[-.189, -.038]) 
and external environment (-.198[-.264, -.132]). Finally, it is actually important to note that 
external environment showed significant correlations with only the two variables mentioned thus 
far – everyday thoughts and personal worries. The rest were non-significant, including the 
correlation between current state and external environment. Of note, according to the Stawarczyk 
et al. model, this correlation would be expected to be positive and significant, since thoughts 
about current state and external environment are both supposed to indicate external distraction. 
 OFF Model. The second model shows how WMC and attention restraint correlated with 
the OFF composite variables, which again reflect the proportions of each response type to off-
task thoughts. Essentially, the purpose of this model was to take a closer look at the breakdown 
of thought contents considered to be off-task. In other words, when subjects were off-task, what 
were they thinking about? This model showed good fit: χ
2 
(110) = 220.38, p < .001, CFI = .948, 
TLI = .927, SRMR = .044, RMSEA = .043 [95%CI .035, .052]. Factor loadings were again 
significant at p < .001, showing similar magnitudes to the loadings in the ALL model. There 
were residual correlations between the same pairs of tasks as in the ALL model. The correlation 
between restraint and WMC (-.650 [-.744, -.556]) was again similar in magnitude to the ALL 
model. These similarities show that narrowing the breadth of the analysis had minimal impact on 
the proportion of variance captured by the two predictor factors of interest.  
 In this model, WMC had significant correlations with only two composite variables: TRIs 
(.111 [.015, .207]) and current state of being (-.123 [-.236, -.011]). Attention restraint failure was 
also significantly correlated with TRIs (-.265 [-.368, -.163]) and current state of being (.141 
[.042, .241]). All of these correlations are weak to modest. Note that, for the same composite 
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variable (i.e., TRI), the correlation with one factor was negative and the correlation with the 
other was positive. This suggests that at least some thought content reports were reflective of the 
relationship between working memory capacity and attention restraint failures (that is, high 
performers had a greater proportion of their off-task thoughts dedicated to their evaluation of 
their task performance). 
 Current state of being was the only composite to significantly correlate with all the others 
in the OFF model. These correlations were all negative, ranging from weak to modest (-.142 to -
.442). What this means is, if a participant’s off-task thought reports included reports of thoughts 
about current state of being, they were less likely to include any other type of report. The TRI 
composite was also significantly correlated with all the other composites, except for external 
environment. Although it was non-significant, the correlation between TRIs and external 
environment was also negative and approached significance (p = .094). The only other 
significant correlation was between everyday thoughts and daydreams, but it was weak (-.074) 
and very close to the threshold of significance (p = .043).  Finally, the correlation between 
thoughts about current state and external environment (-.174 [-.240, -.108) was both negative and 
significant. This seems to be exactly opposite of the expectation for a positive correlation, given 
the Stawarczyk et al. model. 
Discussion 
 Recall that the overarching purpose of this study was to test the empirical distinction 
between external distractions and mind wandering found in a model forwarded by Stawarczyk et 
al. (2011a, b; 2014). Specifically, this line of research treats mind wandering as being constituted 
of stimulus-independent and task-unrelated thoughts (SITUTs). That is, mind wandering is 
dissociated from both the outside world and the task at hand. By contrast, external distractions 
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(EDs) are considered to be unrelated to the task, but instead focused on stimuli in the 
environment. These stimuli might be exteroceptive (related to the world outside of the person’s 
body) or interoceptive (related to internal bodily sensations like hunger). Additionally, the model 
accounts for task-related interferences (TRIs) and being fully on-task in terms of stimulus-
dependency and task-relatedness. TRIs are said to be stimulus-independent and task related, 
while on-task thoughts are both stimulus-dependent and task-related. 
 The results of my study do not quite match up with the picture provided by the above 
model. The model places exteroceptive perceptions and interoceptive sensations both into the 
category of external distractions. Exteroceptive perceptions quite obviously match up with 
response 7 (external environment), while interoceptive sensations match up with response 4 
(current state of being). Given this, if the model is correct, it seems that we should expect to see 
naturally occurring positive correlations between reports of thoughts about the external 
environment and reports of thoughts about current state of being. In short, this does not pan out. 
 In the ALL model, there was no significant correlation between current state of being and 
external environment. In fact, if it were significant, the correlation found between the two (-.055) 
would seem to run counter to the notion that they should be grouped together. Turning to the 
OFF model, recall that current state of being was the only composite variable to correlate 
significantly with all the other composites, and that all of those correlations were negative. That 
is, if participants reported thoughts about their current state, they were somewhat less likely to 
have reported any other types of off-task thoughts. Of course, this includes thoughts about the 
external environment. This result definitely seems to run counter to the notion that thoughts 
about external environment and current state should be grouped together as they are in the four-
way model.  
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Looking at the external environment composite, it was not significantly correlated with 
most other composites. Interestingly, when it was, the correlation was negative. If not for the 
negative correlation between external environment and current state in the OFF model, this 
might be interpreted as making the two more alike than different. That is, these correlations 
might be indirectly capturing something that makes both of them different from mind wandering, 
and thus similar to each other. However, the significant negative correlation between the two in 
the OFF model muddies this interpretation. In other words, they both might be different from 
mind wandering, but it is not clear that they are different for the same reason. 
 Turning to the full confirmatory factor analyses, the first important fact about them is that 
there were very few significant correlations between the predictor factors (WMC and attention 
restraint) and the composite variables. Additionally, the correlations which were significant were 
different between the ALL and OFF models. At first glance, they do not systematically show 
much at all. However, notice that the significant correlations between WMC and responses 
considered mind wandering were negative, while those between attention restraint failures and 
mind wandering responses were positive. Crucially, this includes current state thoughts in the 
OFF model. In other words, thoughts about current state of being seem to be more like some 
types of mind wandering, in that they fit this pattern of correlation. As well, although they were 
non-significant, the correlations between the external environment composite and the two factors 
invert this pattern. Unfortunately, because they are non-significant, it is as yet impossible to say 
exactly what this means. 
 Recall that Unsworth and McMillan (2014) found that latent variables of mind wandering 
and external distraction fit best in a model that treated them as distinct, but correlated. On the 
surface, this would seem to show some support for the four-way model. However, Unsworth and 
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McMillan seem to have used a different definition of external distractions from Stawarczyk et al. 
Whereas Stawarczyk et al. included interoceptive and exteroceptive stimuli in the definition 
given to participants, Unsworth and McMillan use this probe response to signify EDs: “I am 
distracted by information present in the room (sights and sounds).” This very clearly leaves out 
interoceptive stimuli, making it closer to the external environment response in the current study. 
It is unclear how this correlation might have changed if interoceptive stimuli had been included 
in the definition. Given the negative correlation between the current state and external 
environment composites in this study, it might be reasonable to think that it would be positive, 
but weaker. However, if current state thoughts are more like mind wandering – as the CFAs 
seem to suggest, to some extent – it might have been stronger. 
 Although the evidence from this study is beginning to suggest that the four-way model 
makes an incorrect distinction, there is still one important question. Why does it work? 
Particularly, why did thought content reports seem to fall out for Stawarczyk et al. in the way 
they would predict from their model? Most likely, it seems to be because they predisposed their 
participants to give one type of answer whether they experienced thoughts interoceptive or 
exteroceptive stimuli. After all, they took great care to distinguish for their participants what type 
of thought each response was for. By doing this, they did much to ensure that participants would 
choose the right response – according to their model – for any given type of thought. In a manner 
of speaking, they labeled four different boxes, and then asked their participants to sort their 
thoughts into those boxes.  
To be clear, the inclusion of interoceptive stimuli in the ED category was not entirely 
wrongheaded. On the contrary, it follows perfectly from the logic that thoughts can be 
categorized along dimensions of stimulus-dependence and task-relatedness. Stimulus-
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dependence should pretty much act the same whether it is dependence on an internal or an 
external stimulus. To some extent, the present study did the same thing as Stawarczyk et al., but 
with more boxes. The major difference between the two is that the present study was not 
designed to test any particular theory about the structure of conscious thoughts, whereas those 
carried out by Stawarczyk and colleagues were. The interesting fact is, people were not more 
likely to place their thoughts into the external environment box if they had already placed some 
of them into the current state box, and vice versa. In fact, when we looked at just the off-task 
boxes, they seemed to be less likely to do so. The fact that such an association did not arise 
naturally suggests that it may not make sense to impose it by way of thought probe choices. 
In the future, it would be wise to address the concerns raised by the present study more 
directly. Specifically, replication of the present findings would be a strong first step toward 
suggesting revisions to the four-way model proposed by Stawarczyk and colleagues. After all, 
just one contradictory study is not enough to make a complete case against the model. A second 
step toward revising the four-way model will be to test its assumptions – particularly about 
external distractions – against models which do not share them. Again, the current study was not 
based on any particular theoretical model of mind wandering, and does not make claims about 
which alternative model is correct. Therefore, to determine which model is correct, further 
testing of models against one another is needed. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. This is a model of conscious thoughts using the dimensions of stimulus-dependency 
and task-relatedness. Reprinted from “Neural Correlates of Ongoing Conscious Experience: 
Both Task-Unrelatedness and Stimulus-Independence are Related to Default Network Activity,” 
by D. Stawarczyk, S. Majerus, P. Maquet, & A. D’Argembeau, 2011, PLoS ONE, 6(2), e16997. 
Reprinted with permission. 
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Figure 2. This is a version of the 2 × 2 model introduced by Stawarczyk et al. (2011a, 2011b) 
with the current study’s thought probe responses mapped onto the quadrants of the original 
model.  
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Figure 3. Model of the confirmatory factor analysis for the ALL proportions. Note: correlations above the composite variables are for 
WMC and those below are for attention restraint failures. 
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Figure 4. Model of the CFA for OFF. Note: correlations above the composites are for WMC and those below are for attention restraint 
failures.  
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Measure     Mean [95% CI]    SD      Min      Max   Skew  Kurtosis   N 
OPERSPAN    50.667 [49.377, 51.958]  14.313      0.000   75.000 -0.743    0.293  475 
READSPAN    33.820 [32.758, 34.882]  11.114      3.000   59.000 -0.225   -0.451  423 
SYMMSPAN    26.657 [25.962, 27.353]   7.651      2.000   42.000 -0.390   -0.164  467 
ROTASPAN    25.336 [24.543, 26.129]   7.934      0.000   42.000 -0.552    0.018  387 
RUNNSPAN    35.444 [34.523, 36.365]  10.074     8.000   64.000  0.231   -0.103  462 
COUNTERS      0.398 [0.384, 0.413]   0.161      0.070     0.920  0.552    0.146  480   
ANTI-LET      0.475 [0.462, 0.488]   0.146      0.080     0.800 -0.401   -0.535  470 
ANTI-ARO     0.363 [0.345, 0.381]   0.185      0.010     0.790  0.399   -0.695  405 
SEM-SART d'     1.644 [1.559, 1.728]    0.987     -0.170     4.540  0.398   -0.508 526  
SEM-SART rtsd  214.99 [207.15, 222.83]  91.516    87.600   570.460  1.255    1.301  526   
N-STROOP   666.86 [658.13, 675.60]  95.632  422.05 1045.450  0.702    1.348  463  
S-STROOP      -0.008 [-0.015, -0.002]    0.073     -0.140      0.300  1.650    2.812  444 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for all tasks measuring working memory capacity and attention restraint. Adapted from Kane et al. 
(under revision).  
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12   
1 OPERSPAN (.81) 
2 READSPAN .576 (.76)   
3 SYMMSPAN .396 .380 (.68) 
4 ROTASPAN .445 .324 .543 (.76)    
5 RUNNSPAN .453 .373 .274 .196 (.54)   
6 COUNTERS .364 .227 .374 .288 .387 (.85)   
7 ANTI-LET -.208 -.175 -.336 -.212 -.253 -.346 (.89)   
8 ANTI-ARO -.246 -.185 -.304 -.362 -.267 -.330 .593 (.92)      
9 SEM-SART d' .149 .202 .194 .136 .214 .170 -.360 -.273 (.96)      
10SEM-SART rtsd -.145 -.193 -.213 -.110 -.227 -.212 .358 .277 -.633 (.98)    
11 N-STROOP -.171 -.029 -.191 -.184 -.098 -.208 .255 .261 -.126 .209 (.93)   
12 S-STROOP              -.025   -.021 -.108 -.126   -.054 -.118   .192  .209   -.253   .244  .031   (.81)  
Table 2. A correlation matrix for all measures of working memory capacity and attention restraint. Adapted from Kane et al. (under 
revision). 
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N  Minimum Maximum Median Mean 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
Lower 
Std. 
Error Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
LETTFLNK2 460 0.000 1.000 0.083 0.131 0.146 0.116 0.008 0.163 2.242 6.958 
LETTFLNK3 460 0.000 0.750 0.000 0.076 0.086 0.066 0.005 0.108 2.160 6.801 
LETTFLNK4 460 0.000 1.000 0.167 0.266 0.289 0.244 0.011 0.243 0.952 0.217 
LETTFLNK5 460 0.000 0.833 0.000 0.064 0.074 0.054 0.005 0.106 2.510 8.978 
LETTFLNK6 460 0.000 0.750 0.083 0.095 0.108 0.083 0.006 0.137 2.122 5.296 
LETTFLNK7 460 0.000 0.750 0.000 0.045 0.053 0.037 0.004 0.087 3.325 16.890 
SART2 526 0.000 0.978 0.244 0.274 0.293 0.256 0.009 0.216 0.871 0.318 
SART3 526 0.000 0.467 0.022 0.051 0.058 0.045 0.003 0.074 2.491 7.689 
SART4 526 0.000 0.978 0.178 0.232 0.250 0.215 0.009 0.203 1.151 1.099 
SART5 526 0.000 0.600 0.022 0.047 0.054 0.040 0.003 0.080 3.150 13.325 
SART6 526 0.000 0.889 0.044 0.096 0.108 0.085 0.006 0.136 2.308 6.685 
SART7 526 0.000 0.556 0.022 0.036 0.042 0.031 0.003 0.063 3.662 20.151 
N-STROOP2 463 0.000 1.000 0.150 0.220 0.240 0.200 0.010 0.219 1.350 1.715 
N-STROOP3 463 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.064 0.073 0.054 0.005 0.106 3.123 16.052 
N-STROOP4 463 0.000 1.000 0.100 0.210 0.233 0.186 0.012 0.256 1.441 1.218 
N-STROOP5 463 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.052 0.063 0.042 0.005 0.112 4.051 22.003 
N-STROOP6 463 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.069 0.083 0.056 0.007 0.151 3.522 14.256 
N-STROOP7 463 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.023 0.029 0.016 0.003 0.068 8.128 98.985 
ARROFLNK2 424 0.000 1.000 0.100 0.175 0.194 0.156 0.010 0.202 1.693 3.032 
ARROFLNK3 424 0.000 1.000 0.050 0.071 0.082 0.059 0.006 0.122 3.746 20.099 
ARROFLNK4 424 0.000 1.000 0.100 0.197 0.219 0.175 0.011 0.230 1.633 2.382 
ARROFLNK5 424 0.000 0.750 0.000 0.064 0.076 0.053 0.006 0.118 2.696 8.860 
ARROFLNK6 424 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.100 0.117 0.082 0.009 0.184 2.686 7.594 
ARROFLNK7 424 0.000 0.450 0.000 0.023 0.028 0.018 0.002 0.051 3.509 17.261 
N-BACK2 461 0.000 1.000 0.133 0.207 0.228 0.187 0.010 0.223 1.406 1.669 
N-BACK3 461 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.045 0.054 0.036 0.005 0.099 5.074 36.845 
N-BACK4 461 0.000 1.000 0.133 0.200 0.222 0.179 0.011 0.234 1.432 1.668 
N-BACK5 461 0.000 0.800 0.000 0.054 0.065 0.043 0.006 0.121 3.629 15.691 
N-BACK6 461 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.084 0.099 0.069 0.008 0.163 2.944 9.737 
N-BACK7 461 0.000 0.867 0.000 0.019 0.024 0.014 0.003 0.058 7.879 101.568 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the ALL proportions.  
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N Minimum Maximum Median Mean 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
Lower 
Std. 
Error 
Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
LETTFLNK2 449 0.000 1.000 0.125 0.189 0.209 0.168 0.010 0.219 1.677 3.046 
LETTFLNK3 449 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.107 0.121 0.093 0.007 0.149 2.084 6.359 
LETTFLNK4 449 0.000 1.000 0.333 0.363 0.390 0.336 0.014 0.291 0.518 -0.744 
LETTFLNK5 449 0.000 0.833 0.000 0.089 0.103 0.076 0.007 0.145 2.287 6.285 
LETTFLNK6 449 0.000 1.000 0.083 0.131 0.147 0.114 0.008 0.177 1.786 3.405 
LETTFLNK7 449 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.066 0.078 0.054 0.006 0.129 3.078 12.837 
SART2 524 0.000 1.000 0.316 0.347 0.369 0.325 0.011 0.251 0.574 -0.411 
SART3 524 0.000 0.870 0.030 0.070 0.080 0.061 0.005 0.110 3.505 17.616 
SART4 524 0.000 1.000 0.244 0.290 0.310 0.271 0.010 0.231 0.864 0.248 
SART5 524 0.000 0.765 0.024 0.061 0.069 0.052 0.004 0.101 3.045 12.369 
SART6 524 0.000 1.000 0.055 0.122 0.137 0.108 0.007 0.167 2.136 5.479 
SART7 524 0.000 0.556 0.023 0.047 0.053 0.040 0.003 0.077 2.953 11.952 
N-STROOP2 454 0.000 1.000 0.325 0.368 0.397 0.339 0.015 0.310 0.554 -0.764 
N-STROOP3 454 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.097 0.110 0.083 0.007 0.148 2.146 5.661 
N-STROOP4 454 0.000 1.000 0.182 0.291 0.319 0.263 0.014 0.302 0.894 -0.373 
N-STROOP5 454 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.073 0.085 0.060 0.006 0.135 2.886 11.102 
N-STROOP6 454 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.096 0.113 0.079 0.009 0.187 2.858 8.732 
N-STROOP7 454 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.034 0.042 0.025 0.004 0.091 5.111 37.507 
ARROFLNK2 414 0.000 1.000 0.218 0.283 0.310 0.256 0.014 0.279 0.930 -0.035 
ARROFLNK3 414 0.000 1.000 0.053 0.108 0.124 0.092 0.008 0.164 2.395 7.092 
ARROFLNK4 414 0.000 1.000 0.214 0.289 0.317 0.262 0.014 0.283 0.959 0.035 
ARROFLNK5 414 0.000 0.833 0.000 0.090 0.105 0.075 0.008 0.153 2.202 5.173 
ARROFLNK6 414 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.146 0.169 0.123 0.012 0.237 2.013 3.561 
ARROFLNK7 414 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.036 0.045 0.028 0.004 0.087 5.015 40.249 
N-BACK2 443 0.000 1.000 0.267 0.360 0.391 0.329 0.016 0.331 0.640 -0.838 
N-BACK3 443 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.075 0.089 0.061 0.007 0.150 3.383 14.431 
N-BACK4 443 0.000 1.000 0.231 0.300 0.328 0.272 0.014 0.297 0.805 -0.342 
N-BACK5 443 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.079 0.095 0.064 0.008 0.167 3.086 10.637 
N-BACK6 443 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.121 0.140 0.101 0.010 0.209 2.214 4.694 
N-BACK7 443 0.000 0.867 0.000 0.028 0.035 0.021 0.004 0.075 4.734 37.625 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for the OFF proportions.  
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  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. LETTFLNK2 
               2. LETTFLNK3 -0.019 
              3. LETTFLNK4 -0.257 -0.193 
             4. LETTFLNK5 -0.078 -0.057 -0.161 
            5. LETTFLNK6 -0.182 0.020 -0.160 0.017 
           6. LETTFLNK7 0.034 -0.071 -0.173 -0.028 -0.026 
          7. SART2 0.365 0.026 -0.135 -0.008 -0.106 0.081 
         8. SART3 -0.002 0.497 -0.103 -0.042 0.008 -0.052 -0.098 
        9. SART4 -0.113 -0.083 0.587 -0.086 -0.079 -0.111 -0.302 -0.084 
       10. SART5 -0.067 0.054 -0.086 0.445 0.052 -0.036 -0.158 -0.045 -0.066 
      11. SART6 -0.056 0.008 -0.085 0.018 0.425 0.024 -0.248 -0.071 -0.203 0.051 
     12. SART7 -0.012 0.039 -0.085 0.097 0.042 0.352 -0.145 -0.008 -0.087 0.066 0.078 
    13. N-STROOP2 0.352 0.055 -0.056 -0.006 -0.148 0.070 0.446 -0.003 -0.102 -0.064 -0.112 -0.012 
   14. N-STROOP3 -0.029 0.211 0.020 0.02 -0.017 -0.003 -0.059 0.286 0.083 0.062 0.038 0.073 -0.027 
  15. N-STROOP4 -0.059 0.022 0.231 -0.038 0.021 -0.043 -0.081 -0.075 0.317 -0.019 0.005 -0.005 -0.360 -0.139 
 16. N-STROOP5 0.105 0.023 0.027 0.189 0.030 0.030 -0.128 -0.009 0.088 0.197 0.168 0.119 -0.139 -0.011 -0.037 
17. N-STROOP6 -0.103 -0.053 -0.009 0.088 0.444 -0.017 -0.081 -0.024 -0.045 0.069 0.365 -0.028 -0.225 -0.012 -0.110 
18. N-STROOP7 0.032 0.105 -0.046 0.006 0.005 0.128 0.039 -0.030 -0.048 0.046 -0.028 0.121 0.013 -0.042 -0.094 
19. ARROFLNK2 0.314 0.097 -0.012 0.034 -0.107 0.022 0.415 0.032 -0.035 -0.026 -0.139 -0.065 0.598 0.008 -0.239 
20. ARROFLNK3 -0.042 0.190 0.045 0.08 -0.035 -0.066 0.005 0.293 0.050 0.036 0.027 -0.020 -0.052 0.514 0.022 
21. ARROFLNK4 0.080 0.010 0.211 -0.039 -0.127 -0.003 -0.037 -0.069 0.302 0.016 -0.085 0.030 -0.130 -0.019 0.498 
22. ARROFLNK5 -0.046 0.006 0.029 0.296 0.013 0.113 -0.026 -0.093 0.079 0.213 0.065 0.059 -0.022 -0.007 0.063 
23. ARROFLNK6 -0.068 0.013 -0.085 0.032 0.457 -0.022 -0.026 -0.042 -0.109 0.025 0.424 0.109 -0.170 -0.022 0.020 
24. ARROFLNK7 -0.077 0.005 -0.034 0.135 0.157 0.133 -0.019 -0.003 -0.089 0.088 0.120 0.233 0.020 -0.027 -0.074 
25. N-BACK2 0.276 -0.091 -0.022 -0.005 -0.061 0.033 0.372 -0.007 -0.009 -0.064 -0.147 -0.010 0.431 -0.022 -0.169 
26. N-BACK3 -0.015 0.363 -0.056 -0.045 -0.032 -0.031 -0.088 0.223 0.016 0.044 -0.021 0.082 -0.035 0.211 -0.001 
27. N-BACK4 -0.098 -0.009 0.248 -0.017 -0.072 0.017 -0.113 -0.034 0.338 -0.027 -0.022 -0.020 -0.150 0.013 0.361 
28. N-BACK5 0.048 0.012 0.058 0.059 0.072 -0.034 -0.076 -0.035 0.038 0.145 0.131 0.028 -0.102 0.104 0.061 
29. N-BACK6 -0.144 -0.021 -0.011 0.037 0.370 0.058 -0.149 0.017 -0.105 0.135 0.345 -0.010 -0.149 0.033 -0.073 
30. N-BACK7 -0.009 0.047 -0.073 0.064 0.148 0.087 -0.026 0.019 -0.103 -0.011 0.120 0.389 0.038 -0.044 0.038 
 
Table 5. Correlation matrix for ALL proportions.  
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  16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
16. N-STROOP5 
              
17. N-STROOP6 0.036 
             
18. N-STROOP7 -0.031 -0.035 
            
19. ARROFLNK2 -0.066 -0.157 -0.012 
           
20. ARROFLNK3 -0.018 -0.022 -0.018 -0.016 
          
21. ARROFLNK4 0.146 -0.154 -0.039 -0.202 -0.077 
         
22. ARROFLNK5 0.380 0.034 0.065 -0.091 -0.029 -0.106 
        
23. ARROFLNK6 0.022 0.633 0.078 -0.225 -0.125 -0.211 0.025 
       
24. ARROFLNK7 -0.012 0.087 0.382 -0.105 -0.041 -0.046 -0.014 0.117 
      
25. N-BACK2 -0.059 -0.103 -0.019 0.427 -0.011 -0.094 -0.038 -0.079 -0.032 
     
26. N-BACK3 0.023 -0.041 0.305 -0.012 0.207 -0.024 0.070 0.002 0.064 -0.077 
    
27. N-BACK4 0.002 -0.060 0.017 -0.064 0.031 0.305 0.017 -0.108 0.011 -0.244 -0.081 
   
28. N-BACK5 0.250 0.111 -0.036 -0.118 0.041 0.088 0.192 0.107 -0.066 -0.166 0.005 -0.072 
  
29. N-BACK6 0.086 0.368 -0.054 -0.069 -0.037 -0.065 0.030 0.365 -0.004 -0.215 -0.036 -0.126 0.070 
 
30. N-BACK7 0.002 0.024 0.066 -0.051 -0.051 0.029 -0.018 0.077 0.392 -0.090 0.003 -0.022 0.018 0.034 
 
Table 5 cont.  
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  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. LETTFLNK2                
2. LETTFLNK3 -0.070               
3. LETTFLNK4 -0.427 -0.306              
4. LETTFLNK5 -0.128 -0.129 -0.240             
5. LETTFLNK6 -0.249 0.010 -0.299 -0.066            
6. LETTFLNK7 0.002 -0.116 -0.251 -0.075 -0.097           
7. SART2 0.356 0.008 -0.162 -0.052 -0.122 0.122          
8. SART3 0.002 0.494 -0.153 -0.061 -0.005 -0.070 -0.158         
9. SART4 -0.194 -0.153 0.512 -0.137 -0.170 -0.161 -0.476 -0.140        
10. SART5 -0.134 0.014 -0.114 0.459 0.048 -0.058 -0.225 -0.057 -0.126       
11. SART6 -0.117 -0.002 -0.164 0.006 0.458 0.017 -0.320 -0.086 -0.295 -0.007      
12. SART7 -0.035 -0.016 -0.127 0.072 -0.020 0.295 -0.200 -0.048 -0.153 0.060 0.059     
13. N-STROOP2 0.325 -0.054 -0.117 -0.037 -0.152 0.051 0.409 0.003 -0.226 -0.094 -0.193 -0.041    
14. N-STROOP3 -0.070 0.202 -0.007 0.006 -0.028 -0.037 -0.128 0.254 0.029 0.042 0.008 0.019 -0.140   
15. N-STROOP4 -0.166 -0.025 0.254 -0.081 -0.053 -0.048 -0.138 -0.109 0.300 -0.060 -0.059 -0.028 -0.564 -0.225  
16. N-STROOP5 -0.010 -0.004 -0.059 0.183 0.002 0.043 -0.154 -0.013 -0.006 0.184 0.110 0.111 -0.233 -0.080 -0.141 
17. N-STROOP6 -0.143 -0.037 -0.119 0.056 0.422 -0.041 -0.137 -0.010 -0.120 0.028 0.402 -0.045 -0.317 -0.065 -0.215 
18. N-STROOP7 -0.005 0.045 -0.081 0.068 -0.023 0.123 0.036 -0.036 -0.088 0.136 -0.033 0.152 -0.072 -0.060 -0.146 
19. ARROFLNK2 0.296 0.013 -0.108 -0.058 -0.137 0.059 0.374 -0.011 -0.169 -0.100 -0.177 -0.076 0.530 -0.042 -0.245 
20. ARROFLNK3 -0.115 0.235 -0.006 0.050 -0.016 -0.098 -0.122 0.283 -0.005 0.031 0.003 -0.009 -0.091 0.433 -0.033 
21. ARROFLNK4 -0.017 -0.071 0.291 -0.122 -0.214 -0.011 -0.127 -0.055 0.320 -0.052 -0.148 -0.030 -0.178 -0.075 0.429 
22. ARROFLNK5 -0.102 -0.028 -0.041 0.273 -0.015 0.089 -0.073 -0.103 0.035 0.182 0.022 0.037 -0.102 -0.078 -0.009 
23. ARROFLNK6 -0.092 -0.041 -0.166 -0.013 0.433 -0.059 -0.093 -0.043 -0.179 -0.025 0.397 0.059 -0.213 -0.049 -0.099 
24. ARROFLNK7 -0.096 -0.043 0.012 0.118 0.082 0.034 -0.056 -0.004 -0.062 0.130 0.052 0.149 -0.014 -0.058 -0.132 
25. N-BACK2 0.321 -0.077 -0.115 0.019 -0.110 0.046 0.324 0.013 -0.109 -0.071 -0.186 -0.032 0.463 -0.035 -0.265 
26. N-BACK3 -0.022 0.256 -0.058 -0.050 -0.047 -0.028 -0.102 0.195 -0.022 0.039 -0.012 0.079 -0.031 0.152 -0.052 
27. N-BACK4 -0.166 -0.010 0.289 -0.038 -0.152 -0.017 -0.150 -0.083 0.323 -0.036 -0.079 -0.020 -0.292 -0.005 0.417 
28. N-BACK5 -0.049 -0.013 0.001 0.078 0.029 -0.025 -0.091 -0.037 0.006 0.092 0.083 -0.037 -0.134 -0.016 0.028 
29. N-BACK6 -0.156 -0.012 -0.084 -0.001 0.395 -0.014 -0.110 0.033 -0.173 0.096 0.350 -0.040 -0.152 0.009 -0.112 
30. N-BACK7 -0.011 -0.002 -0.113 0.035 0.046 0.080 -0.011 -0.021 -0.151 -0.046 0.060 0.302 0.029 -0.083 -0.013 
 
Table 6. Correlation matrix for OFF proportions.  
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  16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
16. N-STROOP5               
17. N-STROOP6 0.008              
18. N-STROOP7 0.010 -0.073             
19. ARROFLNK2 -0.133 -0.204 -0.085            
20. ARROFLNK3 -0.068 -0.082 0.005 -0.133           
21. ARROFLNK4 0.030 -0.227 -0.067 -0.398 -0.168          
22. ARROFLNK5 0.332 -0.009 0.044 -0.198 -0.085 -0.211         
23. ARROFLNK6 -0.020 0.591 0.035 -0.327 -0.201 -0.319 -0.050        
24. ARROFLNK7 -0.035 0.016 0.285 -0.144 -0.053 -0.116 -0.063 -0.001       
25. N-BACK2 -0.129 -0.150 -0.029 0.338 -0.061 -0.101 -0.049 -0.147 -0.039      
26. N-BACK3 -0.016 -0.054 0.140 -0.037 0.224 -0.104 0.027 0.003 0.055 -0.184     
27. N-BACK4 -0.013 -0.144 -0.011 -0.162 -0.006 0.294 -0.008 -0.146 0.010 -0.480 -0.173    
28. N-BACK5 0.201 0.035 -0.032 -0.156 0.015 -0.006 0.143 0.077 -0.066 -0.306 -0.058 -0.166   
29. N-BACK6 0.070 0.413 -0.076 -0.092 -0.059 -0.130 -0.031 0.370 -0.043 -0.337 -0.086 -0.266 -0.017  
30. N-BACK7 0.018 -0.014 0.062 -0.076 -0.067 0.029 -0.024 0.014 0.234 -0.158 -0.050 -0.079 0.006 0.001 
 
Table 6 cont. 
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  1 2 3 4 5 
1. TRI 
     2. Everyday 0.086 
    3. Cur. State -0.048 -0.093 
   4. Worries -0.113 -0.294 -0.079 
  5. Daydreams -0.030 -0.161 -0.043 -0.060 
 6. External 0.030 -0.252 -0.055 -0.198 0.072 
 
Table 7. Correlation matrix for ALL composite variables. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1. TRI 
     2. Everyday -0.145 
    3. Cur. State -0.442 -0.206 
   4. Worries -0.259 -0.039 -0.142 
  5. Daydreams -0.320 -0.074 -0.329 0.015 
 6. External -0.066 -0.051 -0.174 0.026 -0.016 
 
Table 8. Correlation matrix for OFF composite variables. 
